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Abstract 
 
The study estimates the long-run equilibrium relationship between money balance as a 
ratio of income and treasury bill rate for the Zimbabwean economy. These estimates are 
done for two periods, the entire period (using quarterly data) of 1980:01 to 2005:04 and 
the hyperinflationary period (using monthly data) of 1999:01 to 2005:12. These estimates 
are in turn used to obtain estimates for the welfare cost of inflation. Using the Johansen 
technique, the research estimates a log-log specification and a semi-log model of the 
above relationship for the two periods. Estimates suggest that the welfare cost of inflation 
for Zimbabwe ranges between 0.9% and 23.4% of GDP for a band of 10 to 300% of 
inflation in the case of estimations done for the entire period. Welfare cost estimates for 
the hyperinflationary period are 0.4% and 27.6% of GDP, respectively. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Although “global disinflation” (a term inverted by Kenneth Rogoff) saw the average 
inflation rates in developing countries falling from 31 percent in the first half of the 
1980s to less than 6 percent since 2000 (Craig and Rocheteau, 2005), Zimbabwe’s 
inflation trend has been on the opposite path. Other world evidence also shows that 
average inflation has fallen from 9 percent in the first half of the 1980s to less around 2 
percent in 2000 in advanced economies, while the figure for Latin America and transition 
economies dropped from more than 100 percent to about 10 percent since 1993 to date.  
 
In the first decade after independence (in 1980), Zimbabwe was seen as a relatively 
moderate inflation country, with average annual inflation rates hovering below 15 per 
cent (Chhibber et al, 1989). Nevertheless, Makochekanwa (2007) traces how the 
country’s inflation trend skyrocketed especially since 1999, turning the country into a 
hyper-inflationary economy. Currently, the country is grappling with monthly inflation 
rates of above 100 000 percent, the latest being 100 580.2 percent for the month of 
January 2008. Thus, the “global disinflation” apparatus employed in other parts of the 
world (referred above) which includes institutional changes such as greater central banks 
independence, improved monetary regimes and better macroeconomic policies have not 
been implemented in Zimbabwe (at least to a magnitude which is sufficient to ensure low 
levels of inflation). To the contrary, inflation financing in the form of money printing 
spearheaded by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) has been the norm, especially in 
the past five or so years.  
 
In general, the reasons why inflation finance is not an advisable option of government 
finance can be categorized into two: the redistributive and disruptive (welfare costs) 
aspects, with the former having been received much attention in literature than the later1. 
Redistribute effects include the hardship involved by people whose income and wealth 
are fixed in monetary terms, redistribution from lender to borrower, and redistribution 
from private sector to government.  
 
On the other hand, the disruptive or welfare cost of inflation involves the misallocations 
of resources that may result from the heightened uncertainties concerning future relative 
and absolute prices. Bailey (1956: 93) defines welfare cost as:  
 
“…a tax on the holding of cash balances, a cost which is fully analogous to the 
welfare cost (or excess burden) of an excise tax on a commodity or productive 
service” 
 
Graphically, welfare cost of inflation is therefore defined as the area under the inverse 
demand function – the consumer surplus – that can be gained by reducing the nominal 
interest rate from a positive level of i to the lowest possible level (perhaps to zero rate) 
(Lucas, R.E., jr, 2000).  
                                                 
1 For instance, more (if not all) emphasis on the cost of inflation in undergraduate university courses are on 
the redistributive effects. 
 3
 
Inflation, more so high inflation, has a cost that it inflicts on the society. Evidence point 
out that even moderate inflation rates of 10 percent generates substantial costs to the 
society. Literature is abounding with evidence of the welfare cost of inflation even for as 
low rates as below 10 percent. Table 1 provides evidence of the welfare cost of inflation 
in a number of countries as estimated from the studies conducted in those countries.  
  
   Table 1: Empirical results on the welfare cost of inflation 
   Source: author compilation  
   Note: + means results from log-log estimations; 
           : * means results from semi-log estimations.  
 
Table 1 testifies that inflation (and most importantly high inflation) results in welfare cost 
to any society. On the other hand, figures shows that Zimbabwe’s inflation has been on 
an upward trend for close to two decades. Despite these two fact (the welfare cost of 
inflation and Zimbabwe’s high inflation trend), no study (to the best knowledge of the 
author) has been done to attempt to measure the welfare cost of such high inflation for the 
Zimbabwean economy. To this end, this paper aims to close this gap in literature about 
the welfare cost of inflation in the country. To try and capture the welfare costs of higher 
inflation, the study estimated models for two periods: the entire period (1980 to 2005) 
using quarterly data and the higher or hyperinflation (hyperinflation as defined by Cagan, 
1956) period from 1999 to 2005 using monthly data.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical 
underpinnings to the estimation of the welfare cost of inflation, with Section 3 discussing 
data sources, stationarity and cointegration tests. Section 4 presents estimations from both 
the log-log and semi-log money demand specifications, as well as calculating the welfare 
cost estimates for the Zimbabwean economy for the two periods. Conclusion is presented 
in section 5. 
 
 
 
 
Author(s) Year Country studied Inflation 
rate (%) 
Welfare cost 
(% of GDP)  
Gupta, R & J. 
Uwilingiye 
 
2008 South Africa 3 
6 
10 
15 
0.34+(0.34)* 
0.67 (0.76) 
1.08 (1.43) 
1.56 (2.41) 
Ireland, P. N 2007 USA 3 
10 
0.01 
0.22 
Lagos, R & R. Wright 2005 USA 10 1 to 5 
Serletis et al 2004 Canada and USA 10 1 
Lucas, R. E, jr 2000 USA 10 0.9 
Lucas, R. E, jr 1981 USA 10 0.45 
Fisher, S 1981 USA 10 0.3 
 4
2. Theoretical framework 
 
A point of departure is the fact that money provides some services to society by 
facilitating exchange of commodities. Thus, the cost of inflation corresponds to a 
reduction in these services provided by money. Since inflation by its nature erodes the 
purchasing power of money balances, economic agents tend to conduct their transactions 
with fewer money balances as the inflation rate increases. For instance, they resort to 
alternative payment arrangements, such as credit or barter, which can be less efficient or 
more costly. In some cases they also buy the services of financial intermediaries to help 
manage their cash balances.  
  
In order to capture and measure the cost of inflation, there is need to get a (an imaginary) 
sense of the non-monetary benefits generated by a stock of money and assign them some 
equivalent value in dollars. Typically, economists measure the convenience that one 
enjoys by holding cash with the nominal interest rate (which is approximately the sum of 
a real interest rate and the anticipated inflation rate). The idea behind the use of nominal 
interest rate is that holding cash is convenient because it can facilitate exchange, and 
people are willing to give up something for that convenience. What they are willing to 
give up is what they could have earned had they put the cash to some non-risky money-
making use, that is, if they had they invested it in the safest interest bearing asset 
available (Craig and Rochetau, 2005). As an example, if the interest rate on government 
securities is 8 percent, then the services provided by holding an additional dollar should 
be worth 8 cents a year.  
 
Among the methods used to capture and measure the welfare cost of inflation are the 
“welfare triangle” which gave rise to the consumer surplus approach which was 
developed by Bailey (1956) and also employed by Lucas (2000), the Lucas’ (2000) 
compensating variation approach and the search model of monetary exchange which was 
formulated by Lagos and Wright (2005). This paper employs the Bailey (1956) consumer 
surplus approach (as employed by Lucas 2000). This approach utilizes techniques from 
both public finance and applied microeconomics.  
 
To simplify the analytical discussion, one strong assumption is made. The study assumes 
that the real interest rate is close to zero so that terms “inflation rate” and “interest rate” 
can be used interchangeably (and this does not affect the conclusions of the study).  
 
If the nominal interest rate measures the nonpecuniary benefit that money gives people, 
one can approximately calculate the cost of inflation by estimating the proportion of the 
benefit which is lost when inflation rises. As pointed by Craig and Rochetau (2005).  The 
benefit lost is a function of the fact that people hold less money (in real terms) as the rate 
rises; less money held equals less of its benefit obtained. In Figure 1, we represent the 
relationship between the interest rate and the stock of real money balances in the 
economy. (This relationship is referred to as the money demand function). To facilitate 
the calculation of welfare cost of inflation, we compare resource allocations when 
nominal interest rate is greater than zero (r > 0) to a benchmark case of zero nominal 
interest rate (r = 0).  When the stock of real balances is 50 (just an arbitrary point along 
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the possible values of money balances), the benefit that one enjoys by holding an 
additional dollar is measured by the interest rate that corresponds to 50 real balances on 
the money demand curve (in this case, 10 percent). Equivalently, it is the length of the 
segment between points X and Y. The total benefit provided by real balances can then be 
identified as the area under the money demand curve (that is, the sum of all segments 
under the curve). The maximum total productivity of real balances occurs when the 
interest rate is zero, because at this point, one loses nothing by holding money (the level 
of real balances in Figure 1 corresponding to this point is 100). Thus the welfare cost of 
inflation is minimized when the nominal interest rate is zero (a famous result known as 
the Friedman rule). 
 
If the interest rate increases from 0 to 10 percent, then individuals economize on their use 
of real money balances. In Figure 1, real balances fall from 100 to 50. The area under the 
money demand relationship, the “triangle” XYZ in Figure 1, measures the welfare cost of 
having a positive interest rate of 10 percent relative to zero. Equivalently, it captures the 
loss to society in terms of lost production and wasted resources due to the fact that people 
reduce their real money balances from 100 to 50.  
 
To measure the welfare triangle XYZ, one therefore needs to estimate the money demand 
in Figure 1 and then compute the area under this curve. This is what Fischer (1981) and 
Lucas (2000), among others did to come up with their estimates recorded in Table 1. 
Thus, to this end, the paper will follow Lucas’ (2000) theoretical model and will briefly 
present it below. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Welfare Triangle  
          
       Nominal interest    
    
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
                
                                     
       10% ………………... Y               
                            
                                       X          Z 
              0 50                            100   
                                   Real money balances  
                 
               Source: Bailey (1956: 95) 
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Thus, the analysis so far indicates that money demand specification is paramount in 
investigating the appropriate magnitude of the welfare cost of inflation in any economy. 
Lucas (2000) analyzed two competing demand for money specifications. One, motivated 
by Meltzer (1963), relates the natural logarithm of m, the ratio of nominal money 
balances to nominal income, to the natural logarithm of r, the short-term nominal interest 
rate. This specification is represented as follows:   
 
ln(m) = ln(A) – η ln(r)                                                                                                       (1) 
 
where A > 0 is a constant and η > 0 measures the absolute value of the interest elasticity 
of money demand. The other money demand specification, adapted from Cagan (1956), 
links the log of m instead to the level of r via  
 
ln(m) = ln(B) - ζr,                                                                                                              (2) 
 
where B > 0 is a constant and ξ > 0 measures the absolute value of the interest semi – 
elasticity of money demand for money with respect to the interest rate. 
 
Lucas (2000), after applying the outline of Bailey (1956), translated the evidence on 
money demand into a welfare cost estimate. As before, Bailey (1956) defined the welfare 
cost of inflation as the area under the inverse demand function – or the consumer surplus 
that could be gained by reducing the interest rate from r to zero. Thus, if m(r) is the 
estimated function and ψ(m) is the inverse function, the welfare cost can algebraically be 
defined as: 
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rrmdxxmdxxrw ψ                                                                              (3) 
 
Given that the function m has the dimensions has the dimensions of a ratio to income, so 
does the function w. The value of w(r) shows the fraction of income people would require 
as compensation in order to make them indifferent between living in a steady-state with 
an interest rate constant at r and an otherwise identical steady state with an interest rate of 
(or near) zero. Lucas (2000) also shows that the welfare cost of inflation, w(r), as a 
percentage of GDP is represented by:  
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)( rArw                                                                                                          (4)   
 
when money demand takes the log-log form and 
 
( )[ ]rerBrw ξξ
ξ
−+−= 11)(                                                                                                   (5) 
when money demand takes the semi-log form. 
 
An important observation from (4) and (5) is that an estimate of the interest elasticity of 
money demand is central in evaluating the welfare cost of inflation. Thus, the first step is 
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to obtain the long-run relationship between the ratio of money balance to income and a 
measure of the opportunity cost of holding money, captured by a short-term nominal 
interest rate (Gupta, R and Uwlingwe, J, 2008). The coefficients obtained in the long-run 
relationships are then inserted into the relevant places in equations (4) and (5) to get the 
welfare cost of inflation. 
 
 
 
3.1 Data Analysis  
 
3.2 Data Sources 
 
 
The study employed both monthly and quarterly time series data, with the former 
covering the first month of 1999 to the last month of 2005. On the other hand, the 
quarterly series was from the first quarter of 1980 to the fourth quarter of 2005. The two 
series were obtained from Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). The two variables used in 
this research are the real money balances ratio (rm3) generated by dividing the broad 
money supply (m3) with the nominal income (nominal GDP), and short term 91 days 
Treasury bill rate (tbr). Also necessary transformations are done, especially when 
estimating the logarithmic values.  
  
 
3.2 Stationarity and Stability tests 
 
Given the nature of time series variables, this section presents the univariate 
characteristics of the data. Stationarity tests are done on the three variables, lrm3, ltbr and 
tbr using the Augmented – Dickey – Fuller (ADF), Kwaiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS) and Phillips Peron (PP). These tests were performed for all the three series for 
both the quarterly and monthly data sets. As reported in Appendix Tables A1 and A2, all 
the three variables follow autoregressive process with unit root. In both the ADF and PP, 
the null hypothesis of a unit root could not be rejected for the variables expressed in level 
form, while for the KPSS; the null of stationarity was rejected for all the variables in 
level form. Thus, since the variables were non-stationary, the Johansen test for 
cointegration between lrm3 and ltbr (1) and lrm3 and tbr (2) was employed for both the 
entire and the hyperinflation periods.  
 
Stability tests of the VAR models (log-log, and semi-log specifications for both the entire 
and hyperinflation periods), including a constant as an exogonous variable were also 
performed. The results are presented in Tables 3 through to 6 of the Appendix. Since no 
roots were found to lie outside the unit circle for the estimated VARs based on 4 lags 
under the log-log and the semi-log specifications for the entire; and based on 2 lags for 
the hyperinflationary period, the study conclude that all the four VARs are stable and 
suitable for further analysis.  
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3.3 Cointegration Test 
 
The study tested for the cointegrating relationship based on the Johansen (1991, 1995) 
approach. For this purpose, we included four lags in the quarterly (entire period) VARs, 
and 2 lags for the monthly (hyperinflationary) VARs. In both the quarterly and monthly 
VARs, we allowed the level data to have linear trends, but the cointegrating equations to 
have only intercepts. Based on the Pantula Principle, both the Trace and the Maximum 
Eigen Value tests, showed that there is one stationary relationship in the data (r = 1) at 5 
percent level of significance for both the log-log and the semi-log specifications, in both 
the quarterly and monthly estimations. The results have been reported in Table 7 through 
to Table 10 of the Appendix. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results  
  
The long run estimates for the log-log and semi-log specifications for entire period, that 
is, 1980 (first quarter) to 2005 (fourth quarter), are given as follows:  
 
lrm3 = - 1.158424 – 0.247493ltbr    (log – log specification)                                           (6) 
                                   (-3.42012) 
 
lrm3 = -0.524234 – 2.01980tbr      (semi – specification)                                               (7) 
 (-2.94003) 
 
While the corresponding estimates for the hyperinflationary period estimated using 
monthly data are as follows:  
 
lrm3 = -1.391661 – 0.480984ltbr    (log – log specification                                             (8) 
    (2.43290) 
 
lrm3 = -0.20827 – 0.0531590tbr      (semi – log specification)                                        (9) 
                                  (-3.12943) 
   
 
The interest elasticities for both log-log specifications, in absolute term are 0.24749 and 
0.480984, respectively for the entire period and the hyperinflation period. The 
corresponding interest semi elasticities also in absolute terms are 2.01980 and 0.053159, 
respectively. As can be seen from equations (6) through (9), the signs of the interest rate 
variable in all the four equations have both correct signs and are significant, thus 
adhering to economic theory. Thus, based on these four equations (two for entire period 
and two for hyperinflation period), the author is now ready to calculate the welfare cost 
of inflation for Zimbabwe following Lucas (2000), and as presented earlier in equations 
(4) and (5).  
 
Calculation for the intercept and slope coefficients reported for the entire period under 
the log – log specification results in the values of A = 0.313980625 and that of η = 
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0.247493, while for the semi – log specification the values of B = 0.592009 and that ofξ  
= 2.0198. The respective values for the hyperinflation estimations are A = 0.248662, η = 
0.480984, B = 0.811988 and ξ  = 0.053159. 
 
Given the above values, the next step will be inserting these values into the 
corresponding formula for the welfare cost measures, given by equation (4) for log-log 
specification and equation (5) for semi-log specification. It is also assumed that real 
interest rate over the entire period (1980 to 2005) was equal to 39.91, while for the 
hyperinflation period was 97.09. These respective real interest will imply a nominal rate 
of interest equal to 39.91 (entire period) and 97.09 (hyperinflation period). These real and 
nominal interest rates will allow the calculation of the benchmark values of the welfare 
cost of inflation (w) under price stability in the respective periods2. Reading from real 
interest baselines stated above, a value of r = 49.91 corresponds to a ten percent rate of 
inflation, while, when r = 89.91 will imply a 50 percent inflation and so on for the entire 
period calculations. During the hyperinflation period, values of r = 107.09 and r = 147.09 
will mean inflation rates of 10 and 50 percent, respectively. The actual welfare cost of 
inflation are then evaluated by subtracting the value of w at an inflation equal to zero 
from the value of the same at a positive rate of inflation.  
 
Table 2 therefore present the measures of the welfare costs of inflation, under the log-log 
and the semi-log specifications for two periods under consideration and for the inflation 
rates of 10, 50, 100, 150, 200 and 300 percent, for both the two periods3.  
 
  Table 2: Welfare Cost of Inflation (percentage of GDP) 
Inflation 
rate  
Entire Period Hyperinflation Period 
Log-Log Semi - Log Log-Log Semi - Log 
10 0.9 2.2 1.2 0.4 
50 4.4 10.2 5.5 2.5 
100 8.1 17 10.1 5.9 
150 11.6 20.6 14.2 10.1 
200 14.8 22.3 17.9 15.2 
300 20.8 23.4 24.4 27.6 
 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, an inflation rate of 10 percent results in welfare costs to the 
magnitude of 0.9 percent of GDP for log-log specification and 2.2 percent of GDP for 
semi-log specification, when one considers the entire period. The corresponding welfare 
                                                 
2 Note, as in Ireland (2007), we define the real rate of return to be equal to the difference between the 
nominal interest rate and the inflation rate, where the inflation rate is obtained as the percentage change in 
the seasonally adjusted series of the CPI. 
 
3 Whilst most studies limit their analysis for inflation below 20 percent, the fact that the Zimbabwean 
economy has generally been experiencing relatively higher inflation (above 20 percent) for a long time 
necessitates the study to go up to 300 percent inflation rates in the analysis.  
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costs for the hyperinflation period are 1.2 percent and 0.4 percent of GDP, respectively. 
On the other hand, a 300 inflation rate is more damaging during the hyperinflationary 
period as it results in a welfare cost of 24.4 and 27.6 percent of GDP for the log-log and 
semi-log, respectively; while the same inflation rate results in welfare cost of 20.8 and 
23.4 percent of GDP, respectively for the entire period. The other inflation figures are 
interpreted the same.   
 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This research uses the Johansen (1991, 1995) cointegration technique to first obtain an 
appropriate long-run money demand relationship for the Zimbabwean economy and then, 
in turn, construct welfare cost estimates based on the money demand function, as outlined 
in Lucas (2000). This exercise was done for both the quarterly data over the period of 
1980:01 to 2005:04 as well as for the monthly data for the period 1999:01 to 2005:12. In 
both cases, estimates were done for log – log function and semi – log specifications. The 
research’s findings indicates that the welfare cost of inflation for Zimbabwe ranges 
between 0.9 percent and 23.4 percent of GDP for a band of 10 to 300 percent of inflation 
in the case of estimations done for the entire period. The corresponding welfare cost of 
inflation estimates for the hyperinflationary period are 0.4 percent and 27.6 percent of 
GDP, respectively.  
 
Given these estimates, one can conclude that the high inflationary environment which has 
characterized the Zimbabwean economy for a relatively long time has hurt the country’s 
long run economic growth. Thus, the authorities need to implement serious anti - 
inflationary policies and measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11
REFERNCES 
 
Bailey, M. J. 1956. 
The welfare cost of inflationary finance. Journal of Political Economy 64: 93–
110. 
 
Cagan, P. 1956. 
The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation. In: Studies in the Quantity Theory of 
Money, Milton Friedman (ed). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Craig, B and G. Rocheteau. 2005. 
Rethinking the Welfare Cost of Inflation. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
 
Fisher, S. 1981. 
Towards an Understanding of the Costs of Inflation: II. Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy 15: 5-41. 
 
Friedman, M. 1969. 
The optimum quantity of money. In: In the Optimum Quantity of Money and 
Other essays. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company. 
 
Ireland, P.N. 2007. 
On welfare cost of inflation and the recent behaviour of Money Demand. 
Working paper, Department of Economics, Boston College. 
 
Johansen, S. 1991. 
Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in Gaussian Vector 
Autoregressive Models. Econometrica 59: 1551–1580. 
 
Johansen, S. 1995. 
Likelihood-based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Models. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Lucas, R.E.Jr. 2000. 
Discussion of: Stanley Fischer, Towards an Understanding of the Costs of 
Inflation II. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 15: 43-52. 
 
Lucas, R.E.Jr. 2000. 
Inflation and Welfare. Econometrica  68:247–74. 
 
Makochekanwa, A. 2007. 
A Dynamic Enquiry into the Causes of Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe. Working 
Paper Series 2007 – 10.University of Pretoria, Department of Economics  
 
 
 
 12
Meltzer, A. H. 1963. 
The Demand for Money: The Evidence from the Time Series. Journal of 
Political Economy 71: 219-246. 
 
Serletis, A and K. Yavari. 2004.  
The welfare cost of inflation in Canada and the United States. Economics Letters 
84: 199–204. 
 
Lagos, R and R, Wright. 2004. 
A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Sta. Report 346 
 
Uwilingiye, J and R. Gupta. 2008 (forthcoming) 
Measuring the Welfare Cost of Inflation in South Africa. South African Journal 
of Economics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13
APPENDIX  
 
Table A1: Univariate characteristics of all the variables (Quarterly series)  
*(**)[***] Statistically significant at a 10(5)[1] percent level 
Key: ττ: Means Trend and Intercept 
         τµ   Means intercept    
         τ     Means None  
 
The Augmented Dickey- Fuller, Kwaiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin and Phillips Peron 
results tests for non-stationarity shows that all the variables appear to be integrated of 
order one that is stationary after first differencing. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Series Model ADF  KPSS PP Conclusion 
  τ τµ ττ φ3 φ1 τ τµ ττ τ τµ ττ 
LRM3 ττ 1.868 3.96 0.187** 2.033  
Non – Stationary  τµ 0.983 0.966 0.330 0.733 
τ -0.911 ----- ----- -0.933 
D(LRM3) ττ -8.364*** 35.36*** 0.246*** -8.363***  
Stationary τµ -8.103*** 65.66*** 0.533** -8.127*** 
τ -8.02*** ----- ------ -8.049*** 
LTBR ττ -4.022*** 3.45 0.050 -2.316  
Non – Stationary τµ -1.279 10.522*** 1.213*** -1.165 
τ 0.918 -------  0.929 
D(LTBR) ττ -7.587*** 20.456*** 0.044 -6.540***  
Stationary τµ -7.615*** 30.829*** 0.052 -6.573*** 
τ -7.467*** ------ ------- 1.80 
TBR ττ -0.613 7.613** 0.1024 -0.970  
Non – Stationary τµ 0.766 9.144 1.031*** 1.670 
τ 1.470 ------  -7.096*** 
D(TBR) ττ -8.236*** 25.227*** 0.097 -7.20***  
Stationary τµ -8.034*** 35.834*** 0.294 -7.170*** 
τ -7.917*** -------- ------ -7.096*** 
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Table A2: Univariate characteristics of all the variables (Monthly series)  
*(**)[***] Statistically significant at a 10(5)[1] percent level 
 
The Augmented Dickey - Fuller, Kwaiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin and Phillips Peron 
results tests for non-stationarity shows that all the variables appear to be integrated of 
order one that is stationary after first differencing. 
 
 
Stability Tests: Quarterly Models 
 
Table 3: Diagnostic Statistics of the Reduced-Form Var Model (Log_Log) 
 
 
Series Model ADF  KPSS PP Conclusion 
  τ τµ ττ φ3 φ1 τ τµ ττ τ τµ ττ 
LRM3 ττ -0.0399 27.176*** 0.326*** -0.252***  
Non – Stationary  τµ 7.092 50.303*** 1.123*** 5.36 
τ 1.892 ------- ----- 8.605 
D(LRM3) ττ -4.484*** 29.211*** 0.065 -9.041***  
Stationary τµ -1.006 25.29*** 0.995*** -6.319*** 
τ 0.290 ------ ------ -2.161** 
LTBR ττ -1.160 1.657 0.273*** -1.206  
Non – Stationary τµ -0.883 0.779 0.33 -1.0270 
τ 0.293 ------ ------ 0.269 
D(LTBR) ττ -9.032*** 40.793*** 0.059 -9.032***  
Stationary τµ -8.865*** 78.588*** 0.269 -8.872*** 
τ -8.896*** ---- ---- -8.903*** 
TBR ττ -0.815 1.593 0.286*** -0.617  
Non – Stationary τµ -0.455 0.207 0.370* -0.324 
τ 0.423 ------ ----- 0.687 
D(TBR) ττ -10.29*** 53.00*** 0.067 -10.308***  
Stationary τµ -9.99*** 99.979*** 0.343 -9.978*** 
τ -9.967*** ----- ------ -9.946*** 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: LRM3  LTBR 
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 4 
 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.997210  0.997210 
 0.922806  0.922806 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
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Table 4: Diagnostic Statistics of the Reduced-Form Var Model (Semi_log) 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: LRM3 TBR  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 4 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.991343  0.991343 
 0.808561  0.808561 
 0.384523  0.384523 
-0.057201  0.057201 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
 
 
Monthly Models   
 
Table 5: Diagnostic Statistics of the reduced-From VAR Model (Log-log) 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: LRM3  LTBR  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 2 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.969076  0.969076 
 0.891598  0.891598 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
 
 
Table 6: Diagnostic Statistics of the reduced-From VAR Model (Semi-log) 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: LRM3 TBR  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 2 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.977088  0.977088 
 0.889408  0.889408 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
 16
Quarterly Series  
 
Table 7: Estimation and Determination of Rank (Log-log) 
 
 
 
Table 8: Estimation and Determination of Rank (Semi_log)  
Sample (adjusted): 1976Q2 2005Q4   
Included observations: 119 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend (restricted constant) 
Series: LRM3 TBR    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.132090  20.58034  20.26184  0.0452 
Sample (adjusted): 1976Q2 2005Q4   
Included observations: 119 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend  
Series: LRM3 LTBR    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.104229  13.53667  12.32090  0.0311 
At most 1  0.005611  0.658364  4.129906  0.4773 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.104229  12.87831  11.22480  0.0254 
At most 1  0.005611  0.658364  4.129906  0.4773 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
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At most 1  0.030793  3.721937  9.164546  0.4551 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.132090  16.85841  15.89210  0.0352 
At most 1  0.030793  3.721937  9.164546  0.4551 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
 
Monthly Series  
 
Table 9: Estimation and Determination of Rank (Log-Log)  
Sample (adjusted): 1999M03 2005M12   
Included observations: 82 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend (restricted constant) 
Series: LRM3 LTBR    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2   
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.438647  50.96867  20.26184  0.0000 
At most 1  0.043203  3.621423  9.164546  0.4714 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.438647  47.34725  15.89210  0.0000 
At most 1  0.043203  3.621423  9.164546  0.4714 
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 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
 
 
Table 10: Estimation and Determination of Rank (Semi-Log)  
Sample (adjusted): 1999M03 2005M12   
Included observations: 82 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend (restricted constant) 
Series: LRM3 TBR     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.432788  49.48730  20.26184  0.0000 
At most 1  0.035825  2.991535  9.164546  0.5823 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
                  
 
